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text and terrain: mapping sexuality and law


Abstract. This article is concerned with the intersections of law, texts and sexuality. Drawing on recent work in theoretical cartography, this article seeks to argue that a cartographical reading of law can be usefully brought to bear on the legal analysis of sexuality. This article considers how looking to contemporary theoretical and critical cartography can help to reveal law as a process of mapping; how sexuality is mapped both within and without the law through cultural texts, and how law’s encounters with the terrains mapped out by those texts might be enriched and diversified. This article seeks to consider how legal mappings of the terrains of sexuality might be sufficiently contextualised and located within a wider socio-political context, and how a specifically cartographical interpretation might reveal the potential for the law to accommodate the complexity of gendered and sexualised identities that do not easily conform to singular positionings. In order to navigate the texts and terrains of law and sexuality, we must first learn to become cartographers, and through this process, perhaps open up radical and alternative mappings. 







Introduction: of arabesques and rhumb lines

‘I do not see my obsession with maps and travellers’ tales as being in conflict with my spiritual concerns. Not in the least. My role as a cartographer is tantamount to the discovery of the world.’​[1]​ 

I am becoming obsessed with maps. 

Increasingly, I find myself seduced by the poetry of their unique language: of wind roses and longitude, arabesques, orthogonals and rhumb lines, their art in textures, colours, and their promises of new landscapes. For most people, particularly legal scholars, for whom maps may not appear to have much relevance or appeal, I suspect that my reaction might be seen as rather unusual, and indeed, in the terms of De Sousa Santos, our everyday encounters with maps are mainly of a ‘vulgar and trivial nature’.​[2]​ Worse than this, at first glance, maps appear to be totally obscure, with their strange hieroglyphs and contours impenetrable and bizarre. Alternatively, their usefulness can be dismissed as banal functionality, just a graphic register or description of space,​[3]​ a chart that enables you to reach a destination,​[4]​ or in the words of the 17th Century cartographer J.L. Legrange, simply ‘a plane figure representing the earth, or part of it’.​[5]​ However, recent academic movements in cartography have begun to deconstruct the map and the act of mapping, revealing both in new and complex lights. Like the law, maps are neither innocent nor neutral, and theoretical cartographers and geographers have sought to explore and illustrate mapping’s socio-political, economic and historic dimensions through critical and interdisciplinary work.​[6]​ Maps can be seen simultaneously or severally as social constructions,​[7]​ visual artefacts, meditative and religious texts, mnemonics, semiotic systems or instruments of political rhetoric, giving specific statements about the lands they depict.​[8]​ As Jacob asks: ‘every map displays a specific world; so does it display the world as it is, as it was, as it will be, as it could be, or as it should be?’​[9]​ No single answer to his question may be right, but what is clear is that any map carries layers of signification and carries shifting and contextually specific meanings. Such plural, fluid and dynamic readings of maps could be usefully drawn on in the legal sphere, in order to capture and reflect the multiple dimensions of its subjects and terrains, yet mapping, particularly as informed by contemporary cartographic interpretations, has received less detailed consideration than one would have thought.​[10]​ Given this position, I take the opportunity in this article to specifically refer to contemporary critical cartography and other cartographical/textual sources in order to consider law as a process of mapping, particularly as it might encounter and describe the terrains of sexuality.​[11]​ 

Indeed, in a recent article on lawyers, mapping and discrimination, Emily Grabham explicitly draws attention to the cartographic processes of the law as it charts aspects of identity in order for them to become legally intelligible, arguing that the ‘pre-existing map’ of the self that the law describes does violence to the more complex lived realities of its subjects.​[12]​ As she explains: 

‘…lawyers use cartographic methods, such as chronologies and further and better particulars, to map, and reduce, their clients’ experiences onto intelligible legal frameworks. These frameworks require and embed processes of categorisation that leave clients with a sense that they have been ‘disauthenticated’ through their interaction with the law.’​[13]​

Recounting her attempts to process the discrimination claim of a client, which included issues of race, sexual orientation, sex and gender, Grabham explains how the maps of identity that the law has (pre-)constructed simply fail to translate the intersectionality of the client’s true position. Instead of re-drawing or re-reading the map/s of identity to include diverse or uncharted experiences, the legal process for translating the claim relies on, and, in turn, produces, limited cartographies which only serve to (further) reify law’s categories of the self:

‘[D]ynamics that pass through sex, ethnicity, gender and sexuality, never fully inhabiting one or the other, challenge…temporal limits. These intersectional dynamics are irreducible to one ‘ground’ and happen at the same time, and/or within indeterminate periods of time. They cannot be reproduced in tabular form’.​[14]​  

Reflecting on this position, her article valuably highlights the challenges that intersectionality presents, in that existing legal cartographies, by statically representing legally constructed spaces that are always prior and exclusive, are not fully able to do justice to the intricate positions of their subjects.​[15]​ Grabham observes that simply changing the structure of the law will not be sufficient, but that a change to the cartographic methods that lawyers employ will be needed.​[16]​ 

A critical interrogation of law, mapping and sexuality, then, would appear to be a particularly apposite endeavour, and combining cartography and law can serve a number of functions, particularly in the context of sexuality. Considering law as cartography can help us to consider how law might work as a process of mapping,​[17]​ and how law’s cartographic endeavours might be more informed, particularly in the context of its mapping sexuality. My argument shall be that law can profitably seen as a process of mapping, that sexuality itself is susceptible to mapping, and indeed has successfully been mapped through cultural texts. ​[18]​ I will argue that we, as socio-legal researchers, might valuably consider these various mapping, both within the law and without, as a whole, in order that dissident sexualised and gendered identities might be legally described in a more representative manner. Cartographical readings of law can open up alternative ways of thinking about law’s encounter with the terrain of sexuality and how our study of it as socio-legal researchers might be enriched whilst maintaining sight of other important aspects such as issues of power and context. Engaging with Grabham’s incisive criticisms of current legal cartography, I will be arguing in this article that cartography itself may have the capacity to reflect and accommodate the plural, asynchronous facets of sexualised and gendered lives in a reflexive and attentive manner.​[19]​ If law is understood as a process of mapping, and mapping is understood as a process of description, then considering law through a cartographic lens, particularly in the context of sexuality, can lead us into new ways of thinking how law might de/scribe reified descriptions, be more attentive to alternative meanings, open up new possibilities, and create points of intervention and transparency.​[20]​ As I will argue in this article, seeing law as a process of mapping can highlight aspects of distortion and flux, which, once rendered visible, can be accommodated and addressed. Indeed, as I hope to illustrate, managing and mediating these very aspects of change are key to any cartographical endeavour, and an explicitly  cartographical reading of law can help to place a critical focus on these issues. Also, seen through the lens of cartography, cultural texts on sexuality become valuable artefacts – maps of unique journeys which we can follow, and the law’s role as their cartographer is rendered apparent. How can we bring such archives, such existing maps, into the law’s own map/s of sexuality, and how might the law’s mapping of sexuality become more inclusive, dynamic and open? An informed reading of maps and mapping thus becomes vital in order to illustrate the significance of such cultural texts, and the crucial nature of how they are read and rendered in/visible by the law.​[21]​ When considering the texts and terrains of sexuality and law, the map thus seems a most instinctive device to employ, given that the map is the place where text and terrain meet. In the context of this investigation, I will call on the concept of the map as a verb as well as a noun, yet mapping in this context must also be understood to be literal – as actual representation as well as process and methodology, and pragmatically capable of connecting the common ground between law and cartography.​[22]​


Possible worlds: A Mapmaker’s dream

We gaze at maps that our eyes chart in each other’s hearts. Together cartographer and adventurer argue over distances and routes while silently acknowledging that these are really only diversions, since we are struggling to make sense of disparate knowledge. We are like oar and rowlock, trying to exact a measure of leverage from one another, even as we acknowledge that we are probably travelling toward the same destination…​[23]​

As calligraphy is so much more than simply writing,​[24]​ so I would argue that a map is more than the visual representation of space.​[25]​ Maps have already been argued to be inherently textual, and as the critical theoretical cartographer J.B. Harley has written of deconstruction and the cartographic text:

‘…we have to turn to the cartographic text itself. The word text is deliberately chosen…Text is certainly a better metaphor for maps than the mirror of nature. Maps are a cultural text. By accepting their textuality we are able to embrace a number of different interpretative possibilities.’​[26]​

Let me argue here that the opposite can also be true, that texts can be seen as cartographical – be read as maps, and, thus conceived, open to such different interpretative possibilities as Harley hints at above. If it is understood that mapping is a process of describing correspondence (or, as we will see, a lack of correspondence), and that a map is a descriptive account written for the purpose of being followed in one way or another; a description of a journey either taken or imagined, I wish to consider how the law might learn from navigating our own texts on gender and sexuality, and how that knowledge might be enriched from an understanding of the distortions that mapping engenders as a process of describing experience. If we accept legal and cultural texts as maps, we can come closer, as socio-legal researchers, to becoming their cartographers; how to understand and follow the unique terrains of gender and sexuality that they chart, and, perhaps, open the way for re-mapping the legal terrain of gender and sexuality.  

James Cowan’s novel on cartography, A Mapmaker’s Dream, illustrates well how the concepts of maps and mappings might work in this context.​[27]​  Set in the 16th Century, Cowan’s plot revolves around the central character of Fra Mauro, a cloistered monk living in a walled monastery on the Venetian island of San Michele di Murano.​[28]​ Restricted by his cloistered confines, he is taunted by the sights and sounds of the Venice shipyards nearby. ‘As a monk’, he admits, ‘I have indentured myself to God. But as a man I have always been attracted by the sight of rolled rope on a deck, caravels newly caulked riding at anchor.’​[29]​ Torn between his religious vocation and his deep desire to experience the outside world, he finally manages to reconcile the two through cartography, his life’s work being to create a definitive map – mappamundi – of the known and imagined world. As he is unable to leave the cloister, tales of the outside world reach him in his cell through various means: through the various travellers, exiles, explorers and seafarers who come to visit him and relate tales of their own journeys, through their recounted knowledge of other travellers or documented information, and, as word of his project spreads, through messengers and emissaries who bring foreign news, documents, parchments and other maps: 

‘Though I rarely stray forth from these monastery walls, all the world is at my fingertips. It journeys to me in the form of other men’s impressions. As if in my throne room I await the visitation of my courtiers, their capes still stained with the dust of disappointment or delight…[e]very item of knowledge that comes my way is like a crust falling from a rich man’s table. I reach for it hungrily.’​[30]​ 

Using these sources, and his own ideas inspired by them, he pieces together the world they describe in order to experience and more fully understand the universe and his location within it. In the novel, the role of the mapmaker and the adventurer are clearly separated: the adventurers lay the basis for the map but it is Mauro that commits their detail to paper for us to follow. Cloistered, he does not and cannot have the same experience as the adventurer, and he is dependent on them in order to follow and map their journeys. Yet despite his limitations, he can come to understand more than one adventurer ever will, by combining the sum of their experiences. Mauro acknowledges that his knowledge is flawed and partial, yet he is not concerned, and does not pretend otherwise, as this is one of the accepted vagaries of cartography. ‘I speculate’, he states: ‘Mapmakers are entitled to do so, since they readily acknowledge that they are rarely in possession of all the facts. They are always dealing with secondary accounts, the tag ends of impressions. Theirs is an uncertain science.’​[31]​ In an age where few travelled, the tales of the adventurers take on a vital significance, being the only concrete way of comprehending the world, redrawing the limits of the known, the possible, and the real. As Mauro observes:

‘Their knowledge is intrinsic in every gesture that I make. I cannot draw in a coastline, or detail the location of a city, or perhaps mark in an underwater reef without paying lip service to what they have already told me. Every word they have uttered is aided by an accomplice, the darkness of wisdom masquerading as curiosity. These travellers have become the eyes and ears of the world.’​[32]​ 

Similar to the cartography of Fra Mauro, we can see, through a cartographic lens, how the law might be able to follow and understand sexualised and gendered lives as described or mapped in texts whilst bearing in mind the distortions and trade-offs involved in their descriptions. Knowledge of sexuality can be brought to the law and its citizens through cultural texts, much in the same way as knowledge of the world is brought to Fra Mauro, alone in his cloister. Chequered and partial this knowledge may be, but like the mappamundi, it can be combined to give a broader picture, whilst still borne in mind as merely one representation of possible worlds, lives, sexualities. As Jeanette Winterson (an author for whom mapping, gender and sexuality are recurring themes) has written: ‘A map can tell me how to find a place I have not seen but often imagined’,​[33]​ and cultural texts of sexuality and gender can be seen as exceptional records of singular journeys that we might follow, or learn from through imagining them if we are unable to trace those particular paths ourselves. Indeed, Winterson’s story continues along the same vein:

‘[I]t seems that all the journeys are done. Not so…if someone else has charted them, let them. Start another drawing with whales at the bottom and cormorants at the top, and in between identify, if you can, the places you have not found yet on those other maps, the connections obvious only to you. Round and flat, only a very little has been discovered.’​[34]​

The methods of our understanding these texts, then, can be seen as cartographic practices, a process of navigation. The discourses of sexuality and gender themselves can be seen as mappings, as processes of representation and description,​[35]​ and I might suggest that the current adventurers of our age, those who are the cartographers of new sexualities and genders, are now the contemporary ‘eyes and ears of the world’ in this respect. As the medieval cartographers who have never experienced Paradise are thrown upon their own imagination in order to come closer to realising it, how else are we to imagine how gender and sexuality might be other than by writing about them and analysing those accounts? Whether f(r)ictional or non-fictional, queer and dissident cultural texts can represent sexualised and gendered lives; texts mapping the unique journeys through sexualities and genders that identities and bodies describe, texts which the law might misread as irrelevant, volatile, threatening, obscene, even, but which read through different eyes might hold other more valuable meanings. Arguably, in a heterosexualised world, gay and lesbian cultural texts take on a heightened significance in the formation of non-heterosexualities, and our recognition of them as maps of fragile, contested or uncharted terrain seems all the more vital. However, it can be seen that the law’s encounters with such texts often ends in foreclosure, censorship and loss, and whilst clearly not all censorship is detrimental, texts that deal with queer sexualities seem more frequently censored than those that do not.​[36]​ The law actively engages in the process of mapping, as it effectively makes choices, through the power of censorship and the process of evidence, about what texts can be accessed, which parts of the tapestry are seen, much as Fra Mauro is the editor of his mappamundi – figuratively and literally his view of the world. As the law regulates our access to discourses of sexualities and our contributions to them, so our view of those worlds and the possibilities they might hold changes.​[37]​ Likewise, any new maps that are created add to our view of the landscapes of gender and sexuality. Indeed, mapmakers already live with distortion and flux, knowing that their efforts are always partial and part of a complex tapestry of description that, once produced, are objects of uncertainty and compromise.​[38]​ This point is underlined by the cartographer Monmonier, who emphasises that ‘a single map is but one of an infinitely large number of maps that might be produced for the same situation or from the same data’.​[39]​ Once recognised as such, it is clearer to see how these cartographic processes – of mapping and navigating – are significant, and how they affect our knowledge of sexuality and gender. As we struggle as socio-legal researchers to make sense of disparate lives, their maps, cartographies and compromises might be held together by their legal navigators to create a productive tension, like the oar and rowlock that Fra Mauro describes in the epigraph above.​[40]​ Cartographical readings permit us to see texts about sexuality and gender not just as ‘mere’ texts but as archives – maps – of journeys taken and to be followed, which, like the medieval mappaemundi, dissolve the limits of the imagined, acceptable and real. 





‘It is not only necessary to lie with maps, but essential’​[48]​ 
					
I am not original in using maps and the concept of mapping in the context of the law, and previous writers have sought to show how the particular qualities of the map can be useful for legal scholars in different contexts, elements that are instructive to draw upon in the framework of this article.​[49]​ In Moran and McGhee’s article ‘Perverting London’​[50]​, the authors consider the map of London produced by the Wolfenden committee to illustrate incidences of homosexual encounters in the Metropolis. Using covert officer surveillance in public toilets, the police are able to uncover a different London, one that is landmarked by homosexual encounters rather than famous parks or buildings. In the police’s map, the outwardly familiar terrain of London is redrawn as a criminal landscape by virtue of the law that designates these encounters as illegal, and the ‘legitimate’ landscape of the shopping streets and railways submerges under these new legal contours of perversion: ‘Victoria Station is no longer a confluence of railway routes and a space for public encounters but a terminal for erotic routes…the site of an erotic community.’​[51]​ 

For Moran and McGhee, this map is significant as it shows London as a juridically-bounded space, organised by sexuality and its surveillance. As a landscape defined by law, this map also reveals the law itself as a cartographic practice, as a way of reading and describing space, in their case, the space of homosexual encounters. Through the regulation of homosexuality in the city, the authors explore the idea of law as a cartographic practice, and argue that the law can be seen to both regulate and produce space.​[52]​ They note how the law shapes and pathologises the boundaries, territories and movements of the gay male body through the cartographic practices of surveillance and mapping, and consider the homosexual body itself as a cartographic technique, in that surveillance can make it visible or invisible. ‘The body’, they suggest, ‘cannot be reduced to the object of law, it is also a technique of law.’​[53]​ Whilst its location (i.e. the public toilet) might normally make it invisible, the police surveillance renders visible the homosexual male body as outlaw. The surveillance officers themselves must be initially invisible in order not to arouse suspicion, but must later become visible as agents of the law in order to effect the arrest.​[54]​ Only through the process of the law’s mapping do the invisible sexual networks of the city become visible to it. 

For my purposes, several valuable points can be drawn out of Moran and McGhee’s work. Firstly, it is useful that they draw attention to the law as a cartographic practice, something that is capable of rendering something visible or invisible. As Jacob states, ‘[m]aps make the invisible visible’,​[55]​ and in the context of dissident sexualities, visibility is survival; as without a normative history and culture to draw on, subversive and perverse texts are rare maps to their terrain.​[56]​ Moran and McGhee note that law itself can be seen as a process of mapping, which may create and describe its own landscape, but with very different effects, as law carries the power of legitimacy, as can be seen in the Wolfenden map of London. Although Moran and McGhee focus on the specifically spatial aspects of the map, in that it describes a geographical space of perversion, they also consider its symbolic effects, the power of the legal map to describe and authenticate a particular version of reality. They suggest that if the law can re-describe the space of familiar London to that of the underground terrain of homosexual encounters, other maps of the same space are possible. ‘Through the cartographic practices of the law’, they argue, ‘space might be re-imagined and re-valorised in order to produce that space as a different truth.’​[57]​ For me, it is useful to draw attention to the potential of the law to not only describe reality, but to re-create it.​[58]​ As it stands, the law inscribes upon gendered and sexualised bodies a predominant truth, that of the heterosexual, the singular, the normative, but this mapping might be altered. As law might read the terrain of alternative sexualities in different ways, so might it also map their sexualities differently, coding them not as obscene or ‘other’. Thus the maps of the law could be productively (and actively) re-drawn, altering the relationship between legal representations of gender and sexuality, and their effects on gendered and sexualised lives.

Of course, underlying this account of maps and mapping is the idea of fidelity and dissonance; the suggestion that there is a difference between what the law describes and what those who are outlawed by it experience, and the idea that whilst the law purports to faithfully reflect reality, it is less than faithful. Alternative descriptions of reality, the dissident maps left by sexual and gender non-conformists, can be seen as dangerous and destabilising for the law, as they act as a lever, prying apart the connection with reality that law claims as a privilege, and suggesting that there might be more realities than those which the law (re)creates, authorises and sanctions. The factors of fidelity and dissonance as characteristics of mapping are drawn out by another legal scholar, De Sousa Santos,​[59]​ who uses the metaphor of the map in thinking through the stasis that he perceives in the sociology of law. Having noted that law is now a privileged way of mapping or describing reality,​[60]​ De Sousa Santos argues that a key feature of maps is that they must distort reality in order to represent it, but that this distortion is managed by the mechanisms of scale, projection and symbolisation.​[61]​ Drawing a parallel to law, De Sousa Santos suggests that law should also be recognised as having its own distortions, scales, projections and symbolisations, and just as the process of mapping must inevitably fail to be faithful, so law can never truly (or rather, faithfully) represent the social world which it purports to describe. Thus, in order to understand the relationship between law and society, we must recognise where the distortions, scales and projections lie, and accept that true reflection is impossible. This argument is underlined by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, who, in his search for a map of Utopia, writes of the incongruence that mapping inevitably entails: 

‘What I need is a map, but not just any map. What I would need does not exist, because such a map would have to change fractally and follow the permutations of its user. It would have to reverberate the process of a continuous and never-conclusive mapping, or the creation of the Baudrillardian hyperreal, where “the territory no longer precedes the map nor survives it.”’ ​[62]​





‘A map says to you: “Read me carefully, follow me closely, doubt me not.” It says, “I am the earth in the palm of your hand. Without me, you are alone and lost.” 

And indeed you are.’​[63]​
				
As I mentioned in the introduction to this article, recent critical theoretical cartography has questioned the traditional approach of ‘cartographic positivism’​[64]​ and has challenged the view of the map as a neutral document. Whereas the doctrinal cartographer Leo Bagrow, writing in the 1940s, would strictly state that ‘Mapmaking is an art of mensuration and the map is a factual document to which precision of drawing and reproduction are vital’,​[65]​ his comments betray a certain view of the map whereby its main function is to be as faithful as possible in its spatial representation, anything else being a detraction. His evaluation of Fra Mauro’s mappamundi,​[66]​ for example, holds that: ‘the over-abundance of detail in [his] map is a blemish, since the important and accurately drawn geographical features are inextricably mixed with superficial data based on hearsay.’​[67]​ It is this idea of fidelity, that there can ever be a true correspondence between the map and what it purports to describe, that more recent historians of cartography such as Jacob, Cosgrove, Harley and Monmonier wish to challenge. Of course, this lack of fidelity raises the objection that if there is no true correspondence between maps and reality, then there can be no correspondence between the maps of sexuality that I speak about in this article, and the ‘real’ sexualities that they are supposed to portray. The answer, of course, is that there isn’t any one ‘real’ correspondence, but that this very uncertainty is itself of value, in that in misreading these maps, and accepting their vagaries, we can ourselves set out on new courses of interpretation and discovery, leading to new genders and sexualities, whilst perhaps becoming more familiar with the terrain of those we have already begun to discover. 

As deconstruction has sought to show that meaning is never fixed in a text, theoretical cartographers have examined the multiplicity of meanings that a map can hold.​[68]​ As Cosgrove points out: ‘a map, like any other text or image, once completed and produced, escapes the contexts of its production, and enters into new circuits of culture.’​[69]​ Taking up this train of thought, Christian Jacob suggests that we can either think of maps as transparent, i.e., merely a neutral device for transmitting information, or opaque, where the map is considered as an object or set of processes worthy of study in themselves, as well as the terrain that it describes. Using the metaphor of the screen to illustrate the two different and opposing views, he suggests that the idea of the map as transparent corresponds to thinking about the cinema, where the screen upon which a film is projected disappears behind the information that it displays, whereas an opaque map corresponds to the same cinema, but where the projector, film and screen themselves are all considered for the part that they play in producing the visible images, and cannot be, as it were, seen through and ignored.​[70]​ What is significant here is that on one view the map is merely a medium, whereas on the other, it is opened up as a significant object with sociological, historical, and cultural meanings, all of which alter and enrich our interpretation/s of it. ‘The transparent map paradigm’, Jacob writes: 

‘rests upon a number of implicit theoretical assumptions. Most conspicuously, it is based on a conception of image and representation as being an imitation of an external and objective reality. It involves a belief in the map as a neutral, purely informative device.’​[71]​

Yet, when the map is understood to be opaque, the method of its production, authorship, context, and use within a given society are all important, as is the role of the viewer, who, far from being a passive observer, plays a dynamic role in constructing its meaning.​[72]​

In considering issues of context, and the question of what, if anything, is lost in analysing legal and cultural texts on sexuality without consideration of their empirical effects or the social relations of power within which they have been produced, Jacob’s metaphor of opaque and transparent maps seem to suggest a suitable methodology to follow. I have argued above that the some of the most intimate and accessible information we have about gender and sexualities are the maps that the pioneers and explorers in that field have left us. I have suggested that socio-legal research might benefit from reading them, employing the cartography of textual analysis, in order to trace their steps, and in the process map out the contested terrain of new sexualities and genders. Yet in appreciating these texts, I would argue that it is vital to have an appreciation of their empirical effects, and the social relations of power within which they have been produced, taking, following Jacob, the opaque instead of the transparent view. In Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ article on the labyrinthine and paradoxical process of mapping Utopias, Critical Theory and the self, he suggests that: ‘a map reader uses a map mainly for two reasons: either to learn something about herself (where she is located), or to learn something about the geography represented on the map.’​[73]​ To this I would add a third, that a map reader uses a map to realise, literally or figuratively, the possibility of alternatives, whether they be geographies, sexualities or genders. On an opaque view, following Jacob, to know maps – to be aware of them, especially when one is landlocked in a society that privileges certain modes of being, not least heterosexuality and patriarchy, is to realise, like Fra Mauro in Cowan’s novel, the possibility of travel, following those maps in order to escape, which is both liberating and empowering. I would argue that these are the empirical effects of cultural texts on sexuality, which in turn remind us of the value of incorporating their textual analysis into socio-legal research. For those who truly need to travel, a map is both a way out and a life raft. Indeed, as the novelist Pérez-Reverte has remarked, it may sound extreme, but we trust our lives to less: ‘You put your life within three or four fingers’ width of death, the thickness of the ship’s wood hull’.​[74]​ These texts of which I speak – life stories and experiences – help to re-map the terrains of sexuality and gender that are currently conceivable by their very existence and through our studying them. Through them we can come to a closer understanding of identity. On a transparent view of legal and cultural texts, they appear to be merely neutral documents, descriptive of an external reality, whereas on an opaque view, (just as looking at considering the cinema as opaque allows us to consider the screen, projection, sound and lighting as well as the images themselves) both legal and cultural texts such as those I describe above are revealed to hold a wider and deeper significance than that of ‘mere’ text. Thinking about such texts as maps also allows us to consider – mapping being a process of describing correspondence – the extent to which they map on to the reality that the law envisions and creates, whilst allowing us to consider and accept distortion as cartographers must. As De Sousa Santos reminds us, ‘we have assumed to lightly in the past that truth and reality are one and the same thing’,​[75]​ and in considering what, if anything, is lost in analysing legal and cultural texts without consideration of their empirical effects or the social relations of power within which they have been produced, it is useful to remember that the maps of legal texts and the maps of autobiographical texts may be describing sharply different realities, the ‘truth’ of either being shifting and contested.

I would suggest that such a fuller understanding of legal and cultural texts not only helps to enrich our knowledge but is also of political significance, as an awareness of the social relations of power within which texts have been produced can alert us to various power imbalances that lie beneath. If it accepted that law is the agent of the creation and re-creation of power, then we cannot afford to let this observation lie. As I alluded to above, in our current society, some texts are more privileged than others, and we would do well to draw attention to the social relations of power within which texts have been produced and are read. As feminist legal scholars have long pointed out, this is particularly important when legal texts purport to be neutral, when the conditions of their production and interpretation are anything but.​[76]​ In his deconstructive reading of maps, the cartographer J.B. Harley calls on us to recognise the presence of power within maps and mapmaking, and to acknowledge cartography as discursive, i.e. a form of knowledge and power.​[77]​ Likewise, in our consideration of the gendered and sexualised maps of peoples’ lives, we need to be alert to the issues of power that surround them, whether this be the internal power of what they describe, the external forces of the social relations of power that form the context of their production, or the juridical power that the law exerts over their interpretation. If the social relations of power – specifically gendered power – within which legal texts have been produced, are ignored, then their differential and gendered effects are rendered transparent and lost. Regarding cultural texts, a failure to consider the social relations of power in their production obscures the fact that being able to speak, to describe a journey, can be seen as a politicised and dangerous act in a society that privileges some genders and sexualities over others, as can be seen most clearly in the context of the lives described by sexual non-conformists where to leave a map for others to follow is too volatile for the law to permit.​[78]​ As bell hooks reminds us, commenting in the context of black women’s writing, it is vital that we remember the conditions of production in order to encourage and value marginalised maps and testimonies in a culture that does neither:





‘Although I speak of the Meridian as if there were only one, there are actually many. All men and ships have their own meridians.’​[80]​

Thus far, I have been arguing that in engaging with certain questions of context, effects, plurality and power in relation to the law’s engagement with cultural texts on sexualities, the figure of the map can be both productive and provocative. I have suggested that if we see law as a process of mapping, and legal and social texts as maps, we can note how vital attention to context is, the value of legal and social texts to the law and to us as socio-legal researchers, and the centrality of textual analysis – of reading those maps critically. Using a cartographic reading, I have suggested that sexuality and gender might be radically re-mapped, through both legal and cultural texts. However, before concluding, I would like to turn to one more cartographical feature: the meridian. 

Geographically, your location upon the earth will depend on knowing your co-ordinates, your place corresponding to the intersecting lines of latitude and longitude. I like the explanation of these given by Dava Sobel in Longitude, where she compares these lines to those of a wire mesh ball. ​[81]​ Those wires that run horizontally around the globe in a series of concentric rings are the latitudes, or parallels, lying, as they do, parallel to each other; the Equator, the Tropics of Cancer, Capricorn and the Artic Circle. Whereas latitude describes the lines that run laterally round the globe, longitude describes those that dissect it longwise, the meridians; ‘they loop from the North Pole to the South and back again in great circles of the same size, so they all converge at the ends of the earth.’​[82]​ However, whilst apparently doing the same job, that of circling the earth, latitude and longitude differ in one very important respect, which is, whilst latitude is determined by the position of the sun, longitude has no such anchor. This difference has practical consequences, as Sobel explains: 

‘Any Sailor worth his salt can gauge his latitude well enough by the length of the day, or by the height of the sun or known guide stars above the horizon…the measurement of longitude meridians, in comparison, is tempered by time. To learn one’s longitude at sea, one needs to know what time it is aboard ship and also the time at the home port or another place of known longitude – at that very same moment.’​[83]​

Before the age of precise chronometers, figuring out this time and finding one’s position was fraught with uncertainty, and any error was serious, particularly in marine navigation where an error of seconds could translate into miles. Without knowing the latitude or longitude, in navigational terms, one only had a ‘reckoning point’, the result of your best guess with uncertain (or worse, absent) information.​[84]​ In thinking about how socio-legal research on gender and sexuality might benefit from looking at cultural texts, it seems to me that if we accept, as I have suggested throughout, that certain texts describing sexualities and genders might be seen as maps, then we might work out another answer to the question in considering the role of maps in locating the self. I have argued above that these maps fulfil an important symbolic as well as practical purpose, in that they map out for us different configurations of identity that do not necessarily correspond to those charted by the law. Considering how we locate ourselves spatially, through co-ordinates, we might think of textual analysis as giving us as socio-legal researchers (who might also wish to locate our own identity through our studies) the metaphorical cartographic tools to find our co-ordinates, to locate our place in relation to the geographies of gender and sexuality that cultural and legal texts describe.​[85]​ In other words, the maps that I suggest cultural texts provide can help to position the self, and place gender and sexuality at the centre of our research, following, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos states, that ‘well known cartographic rule, which commands that in every map there is a centre, a fixed point, a physical or symbolic place in a privileged position.’​[86]​ Through maps we may locate ourselves, or at least find our reckoning point in the uncertain and shifting terrain of sexuality and gender, and find or make our best guess at our own latitude and longitude, a function which is of particular use in those instances when the genders and sexualities we know or experience do not correspond to those mapped out for us by the law. After all, sexual orientation speaks fundamentally of the direction of desire, and its position within society: this is the very language of cartography.

We might learn yet more, perhaps, from considering the co-ordinates themselves more closely, and the role of meridians in particular. In order to do this, I wish to recall the important difference between latitude (the parallels) and longitude (the meridians). It will be recalled that whereas latitude is fixed by reference to astronomy, the correspondence between the meridians and the earth’s surface is arbitrary. Cosgrove explains that:

‘the relationship between longitudinal lines and the global surface depends upon the selection of a prime meridian, for which no astronomical reference exists…the poles may be regarded as fixed locations, but East and West remain open, fluid geographical conceptions, their location relative and endlessly deferred in navigation’.​[87]​

What becomes clear is that the selection of a longitudinal ‘starting point’, known as a ‘prime’ meridian, is entirely arbitrary, and theoretically any one may be selected. Currently, the prime meridian is at Greenwich, following its declaration as globally prime by the 1884 International Meridian Conference.​[88]​ Before this, the history of cartography has known many prime meridians. Ptolemy’s meridian ran through what are now the Islands of the Canaries and Madeira,​[89]​ Louis XIII’s meridian of 1634 centred on the Isle de Fer, and various other European Capitals such as Madrid, Copenhagen and Turin all acted as prime meridians at various points in history.​[90]​ Pérez-Reverte’s novel The Nautical Chart, even centres around a secret meridian of the Eighteenth Century Jesuits, which in the novel helps to save their precious sea-bound cargoes from the clutches of the Spanish.​[91]​ 

Yet, what also becomes clear is that declaring a meridian as prime has political as much as cartographical consequences.​[92]​ If you choose the prime meridian, you choose the starting point, the finishing point, and the reference point by which all others are reckoned. In order to illustrate the significance of a ‘prime’ meridian, consider Cosgrove’s analysis of the declaration of the Greenwich meridian as prime: 

‘Determining a prime meridian for the globe controls its representation, especially on the two dimensions of a world map whose margins and center are fixed by meridians. Centering a planisphere on the Atlantic, thereby cutting the Pacific at its left- and righthand margins, may have been a practical way to avoid the question of America’s connection with Asia at the straight of Anian, but its ideological effects in centring Europe on the globe are undeniable. Setting the meridian is an ineluctably ideological act.’​[93]​ 

And one, I would add, of power. 






‘I will put together, piece by piece, the perfect city, made of fragments mixed with the rest, of instants separated by intervals, of signals one sends out, not knowing who receives them. If I tell you that the city toward which my journey tends is discontinuous in space and time, now scattered, now more condensed, you must not believe the search for it can stop.’​[94]​

As cartography aims, amongst other things, to describe connections between seemingly disparate or random points, in this concluding section, I consider where the linkage of sexuality, cartography and law might lead us. By deploying an explicitly cartographical focus, I have sought to argue a number of positions. Specifically, by moving beyond the usage of maps as a metaphor for the mental conception of arrangement, I have attempted to establish law as a literal process of mapping, and have tried to suggest how such a cartographical reading can illuminate its wider and more politicised functions in describing the terrains of sexuality. I have sought to argue that sexuality itself is susceptible to mapping through cultural texts, how these maps might be of value both to us as socio-legal researchers, and to the law itself, and how they might be valuably brought, much as fragments of the world were brought to Fra Mauro, to the law’s own cartographical projects. Through a cartographical lens, I have sought to argue that the cultural texts of sexuality act as maps to their terrain, maps which are valuable as records of the topographies of sexuality, and which help us to explore their possible limits, and indeed, depict the imagined lands beyond them.  Cartographical readings reveal such maps as being able to help us orient ourselves as socio-legal researchers, and helping to position ourselves in our attempts to navigate sexuality, gender and the law. Cartographical techniques alert us to distortion and mis/representation, and help us to mediate these factors in our analyses. Cartographical interpretations show the capacity of maps to recognise the non-linear and asynchronous chronologies of gendered and sexualised lives, and I have endeavoured to argue that contemporary cartographical critique reveals mapping as thus having the capacity for multiple, even intersectional​[95]​ readings that are of value in the context of charting their terrain. Echoing the project undertaken by Fra Mauro, I have sought to argue that we, as socio-legal researchers, need ourselves to become cartographers, and a fuller understanding of cartography itself can help us to navigate both law and sexuality, remaining attentive to issues of power and context, placing our own meridians of gender and sexuality as prime whilst acknowledging others. Indeed, a cartographic reading of law sees its mapping of the terrain of sexuality as flawed and contingent, yet open, perhaps, to influence and redefinition. Combining cartography, sexuality and law can give us the critical tools and perspective to enable us to think about how well legal and cultural texts map sexuality, whilst recognising the relevance of their distortions and elisions. Acknowledging the difficulty of capturing, in legal terms, the complexity of sexualised and gendered identities that tend not to conform to the singular positionings envisaged by the law, I have endeavoured to build an argument to the effect that cartography, particularly as seen through a critical and deconstructive lens, itself suggests the methodologies and techniques by which positions of identity need not be represented as reified, static or temporally frozen.
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